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INTRODUCTORY GENERAL COMMENTS
For clarity, respondents-cross appellants Green, Shook, and Castle will in this brief again
often be referred to collectively as "Green" and appellants will again often be referred to
collectiveiy as "Weitz".
In Idaho, for someone to acquire an ownership interest in land without paying for it
andor obtaining a written instrument conveying ownership, one of a very few legal theories
must be complied with and the required elements proven by clear and convincing evidence in a
quiet title action.
It is true that the trial court found, referring to the year 1975, that
"Prior to that time the Schoepflins treated the disputed property as
their own." (Amended Memorandum Decision R Vol. VIII, p.
1639)
However the trial court correctly applied the law and recognized that treating property as
your own will not suffice to transfer ownership of property.
Mistakenly believing that you own something can cause you to develop an emotional
attachment to it, but it will not by itself transfer ownership.
In the case at bar Weitz revealed their beliefs and their emotional attachment, but did not
produce the evidence necessary to meet the high burden of proof that was needed. In fact, as
Green's first brief demonstrated, with regard to some required elements the evidence
demonstrated the opposite of what Weitz needed to prove.
A recently retired judge once made a very insightfnl observation which this writer would
like to relate. Magistrate Judge Hamlett noted, in deciding a matter, that one side had produced

emotion and the other had produced law and supporting facts. Judge Hamlett then noted that in
the court system facts and law prevail.
As is usual in any trial, evidence offered in our case sometimes conflicts. The trial judge
resolved these conflicts properly applying the correct burden of proof.
Appellants' Reply Brief often selectively excerpts from the record and transcript without
providing the conflicting evidence which well supports the trial judge's findings. In doing this
Weitz is trying to get the appellate court to second guess the trial court without considering the
full record. Some of these occasions have already been addressed in Green's first brief and
others will be addressed in this brief.
This brief will primarily address Green's counterclaims. However, because Greens,
Shooks, and Castles cannot prevail upon their counterclaims for trespass and slander of title
without the trial judge being affirmed in his finding that Weitz does not own the land in question,
this brief will also address ownership.

I. BOUNDARY BY AGREEMENT
The trial court correctly observed that Weitz must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that there was an express or implied agreement fixing the boundary. Judge Stegner
then found that "as to the express or implied agreement, the Weitz family has failed to make its
case by clear and convincing evidence." (R Vol. VIII, p. 1640.)
The correctness of this finding is fully supported by Green's first brief at page 12 and that
recitation will not be repeated here.

However, the Weitz Reply Brief questions Judge Stegner's finding that Thomas Rogers'
testimony undermined the testimony of 69 year old Homer Ferguson about a conversation that
took place 30 years earlier. In questioning the Judge's finding, Weitz Reply Brief incorrectly
asserts at page 3 that Thomas Rogers "did not become involved with the property until 2001
when he managed the Family Trust following his mother's death."
The uncontroverted evidence on this point is found in Thomas Rogers' testimony quoted
below.
Q. When did you get out of the Navy and return to this area?
A. I returned in May of 1971. I started school at the University of
Idaho shortly thereafter.

Q. When you returned to this area, what role, if any, did you fill
with regard to this quarter section that you sold to Mr. Green?
A. I basically oversaw the management of it. My mom didn't have
a lot to do with it or didn't want a lot to do with it. She didn't know
a lot about it. She signed all the contracts, set up for logging and
grazing purposes, but other than that I pretty much oversaw what
was going on up there. I tried to make trips up there as frequent as
I could. Tr p. 1753, L. 14 to p. 1754 L. 2.

Further Mr. Ferguson testified that he had contact with Tom Rogers in this same time
frame. ( Tr p. 894, L. 19-21.)
Judge Stegner noted that Thomas Rogers testified that he doubted his mother had ever
seen the fence in question. Thomas Rogers' testimony in this regard was even supported by
Homer Ferguson when he testified as follows.

Q. Did you ever deal with Mrs. Rogers as -- go upon the property
with Mrs. Rogers herself!
A. No, I don't think Mrs. Rogers was strong enough to go up on the
property. Tr p. 894, L. 15 - 18.
Judge Stegner had the opportunity to observe Homer Ferguson, who testified he was 69
years old (Tr p. 892, L. 16). Mr. Ferguson was relating events and a conversation that took place
over 30 years earlier. The trial judge decides what weight, if any, to assign to Mr. Ferguson's
testimony and Judge Stegner concluded that it was "undermined." R Vol. VIII, p. 1639.
The need to show a mutual agreement is made much harder in this case because one is
confronted with the question of why would anyone agree to give away 8 L/z acres of land for free.
This question is never addressed or answered by the evidence in this case.
At page 5 of the Weitz Reply Brief there is a sentence which reads, "All these good
people lived with the fence line being the property line for years until Mr. Green arrived and put
his blinders on and went about his business." The evidence contradicts this statement and
supports Judge Stegner's finding that Weitz failed to prove an express or implied agreement.
The aerial photographs produced by both sides show that this "fence" roughly followed
the northern edge of pasture land on the property Rogers sold to Green. Tom Rogers testified to
the use of the fence to control cattle. Tr p. 1763, L. 8-11. Thomas Richards, an aerial
photograph expert, testified that the aerial photos admitted in evidence from 1987 showed that
trees were cut in the disputed area and skidded down to the landing on Rogers' property. Tr p.
1790, L. 2 to p. 1791, L. 18. This confirmed Mr. Rogers' testimony regarding logging in the
area by the Rogers in the same time frame. This shows that the Rogers used the land north of the

zigzag cattle fence as their own land, did not view the fence as an ownership boundary, and
clearly had not agreed to or acquiesced in the "fence" as a boundary.
11. BONA FIDE PURCHASER FOR VALUE

While attempting to attack the trial court's finding that the Greens were bona fide
purchasers for value, Weitz's Reply Brief makes factual errors.
In the first line on page 14, Weitz's Reply Brief asserts that "The disputed property was
last used as a dairy farm up until 1994". On page 2 of the same brief it is asserted that "up until

1975 the disputed property was a dairy f m . . .".
Mrs. Weitz herself testified as follows:
Well, my grandfather's last cattle left the place - I think the last
one died or was sold in 1972. And to my knowledge the fence
wasn't maintained after that time and it just gradually became
dilapidated and it fell into the ground. Tr p. 255, L. 7-1 1.
Also on page 14, a few lines below the middle, appears a claim that the "large blue steel
gate" was on the disputed property, but all the evidence from both sides places the gate on
property which is included in Weitz's deed and not on the disputed property. See Exhibits 3 and
4 in evidence.
At page 18 of Weitz's Reply Brief extensive excerpts from the deposition of Josh Ritter
are presented. This deposition was properly considered by the trial court. At the bottom of page
18 an answer given by Mr. Ritter is quoted with a portion emphasized. Other parts of Josh
Ritter's deposition are quoted in Weitz's Reply Brief by giving first the question and then the
answer. Here, however, the question posed is omitted, creating the false impression that Mr.

Ritter is referring to activity on the disputed property. If the question and answer had been
given, the following would have appeared in Weitz's Reply Brief.

Q. At times did you - at times did you observe during any
motorcycling activities that maintenance had been done on the
network of roads on the Weitzes' property, just in general?
A. Well, yeah, like driving around, I mean, all the time, you know,
there was always one part of the road that was getting kind of, I
guess, replowed by Jerry in particular like along with the
Caterpillar, you know, and, you know, I can remember him doing
that all the time, up through there, taking the Caterpillar and just
kind of working on a road here and there and just kind of redoing
it, just kind of running the Cat over the road. So, there's that. I can
also, we --you know, I went up with the Weitzes four or five times
at least helping them get wood for the winter in different, in
different places. See p. 18, L. 6 - 22 of the Deposition of Joshua
Ritter.
Mr. Ritter's answer, when viewed in light of the actual question, provides no precise
information as to where any activity occurred. The evidence is uncontroverted that on Weitz's
deeded property there are many roads and many places to get wood for winter. Once the
question is known, Mr. Ritter's answer does not reveal whether the activities he described took
place on the disputed property or Weitz's deeded property.
The foregoing shows that in the Bona Fide Purchaser for Value section of Weitz's Reply
Brief only selective and sometime erroneous and misleading recitations from the trial are
presented. The huge amount of different and conflicting testimony and evidence presented at
trial are omitted in an attempt to get this Court to second guess the trial judge's findings of fact
without considering the full record.

Finally, with regard to the BFP issue, Judge Stegner found that the dilapidated shack
pictured in Exhibit NN would not alter Greens' BFP status. The fact that the related lease and
associated agreement, Exhibits 23 and 24, referenced only land situated in the !4 section
described in the Schoepflin (Weitz's predecessor in interest) deed is important. It means that
anyone reviewing the public records would not receive any indication that Schoepflins claimed
any ownership interest in Rogers' land.
Arguing the impact of Exhibits 23 and 24, Weitz's Reply Brief at page 4 in the first full
paragraph asserts that governmental entities and their employees thought Schoepflins owned the
disputed property. These two exhibits were introduced during the testimony of Rockford Weitz
who was not even born when they were created. No testimony or evidence was introduced about
what any governmental entity or its employees thought or did. In fact no evidence was
introduced to show that any governmental entity or its employees ever saw this tiny structure or
knew its exact location. It may be that Menill Hart ran this repeater station himself. We do not
even know how long it operated.
What we do know is that by the time Mr. Green viewed the property, nothing was left of
this "radio station" but a tiny collapsing shack which was not connected to anything. If there
was a power line at some time, it had been completely removed.
Judge Stegner's finding that Greens were bona fide purchasers is fully supported by the
record.

111. SLANDER OF TITLE
Weitz's Reply Brief says that it cannot understand Judge Stegner's finding that Weitz
committed slander of title. Then the brief at page 28 makes the unjust accusation that Judge
Stegner "seems to pounce upon a singular sentence contained in the complaint".
Judge Stegner's thorough discussion of slander of title begins with the last paragraph on
page 11 (R Vol. VIII, p. 1646) of his final decision.

The judge states clearly that his decision is

not based on a singular sentence when he says:
It appears that the Weitz family slandered the Greens' title by
making the assertions they did in their complaint. The real
questions presented are whether the actions of the Weitz family were
malicious and whether the Greens can show special damages.
"Malice has been generally defined by Idaho courts as a reckless
disregard for the truth or falsity of a statement." Weaver v.
Staford, 134 Idaho 691, 701, 8 P.3d 1234 1244 (2000). As to this
component, it appears that the Weitz family was reckless in its
challenge to the Greens' title. As an example, the complaint
alleges that the hogwire fence on the eastern portion of the
disputed property "extended southerly along the eastern boundary
of the Disputed Property to its intersection with the fence and
fenceline to keep intruders from trespassing on the NE '/4 of said
Section 8 and the Disputed Property." Complaint at fi 21. This
statement is false. Further, it was reckless of the Weitz family to
make this assertion. Consequently, malice has been established.
The final remaining question is whether the Greens can establish
special damages. If they can, then all of the elements of a slander
of title claim will have been proven. A review of the case law
indicates that attorney's fees constitute "special damages" for
purposes of creating aprimafacie case of slander of title. See Ray1
v. Shull Enterprises Inc., 108 Idaho 524, 530, 700 P.2d 567, 573
(1984). Consequently, the Castles, Greens and Shooks have
proven the Weitz family slandered their title. R Vol. VIII, p. 16461647. (emphasis added)

Judge Stegner made clear that Weitz made multiple recklessly false statements when he
used the words "assertions" and "As an example".
There were other examples the judge could have chosen. A couple are given below, but
first it is important to note that on April 12, 2005, Mrs. Weitz filed an affidavit with the court
swearing that the statements in the complaint were true. R Vol. I, p. 170, paragraph 3.

Road
The Weitz complaint at paragraphs 14 and 15 reads as follows.
14. By 1967, a road had been constructed by Schoepflins within
the Disputed Property and north of the fence and fenceline running
easterly and westerly for the entire length of the Disputed Property
(the "road").
15. The road has been continuously used and maintained by the
Plaintiffs and Schoepflins since 1967 for hunting, hiking,
motorcycling, snowmobiling, logging and vehicular access to areas
within Plaintiffs' property and the Disputed Property. R Vol. I, p.
20-21.
Weitz knew that the road had not been continuously used and maintained. Weitz had to
know that these two paragraphs gave a false picture and that this mattered to the case. Gerald
Weitz admitted that there had been no work on the road after 1994 until October, 2002. Tr p.
288, L. 23 to p. 289, L. 1. Thus Greens purchase in July 2002 was before the October 2002 work.
The court made findings regarding this alleged "continuously used and maintained" road
in two places in its decision. These findings read as follows:
Following the purchase of the property, the Greens hired Ron
Monson, a land surveyor, to subdivide their property. Mr. Monson
began his work in August 2002. In the process of surveying, he hung
surveyor's tape on the property demonstrating that he was in the

process of surveying the property. As an apparent result of the
surveyor's actions, the Weitz family sprang into action. Ed Weitz, a
nephew of Gerald Weitz, went up and cut out the log that had fallen
across the trail, thereby enabling motorized travel the length of the
trail without detour. Gerald Weitz, the Weitz family patriarch, took
his Caterpillar tractor to the property and on at least two different
instances bladed the trail in such a way as to convert it from an
overgrown trail to one which would allow a four-wheel-drive pickup
truck to travel from one end to the other. R Vol. VIII, p. 1638.
While it may be true that the trail in question appears in the Weitz
family's exhibits to be part of a "seamless web" of roads on the
Weitz family's property, it did not appear to be so at the time the
Greens bought the disputed property. In 2002, when the Greens
purchased the property, the trail looked like a footpath or a trail for a
motorcycle or a four-wheel, all-terrain vehicle (except where the log
had fallen across the pathway and necessitated passage by some
other means). Prior to the Greens' purchase, the trail had been most
recently bladed by Mrs. Weitz's father around 1994. For the eight
years prior to the Greens' purchase, the trail had fallen into disuse. It
did not appear, on the ground, to be part of a seamless web of
roadways extending onto the Weitz family's property. R Vol. VIII,
p. 1641.
Thus the court found that after altering the facts on the ground, Weitz made a false statement
designed to strengthen its claim and overcome Green's true status as a BFP without notice,
Alleged fence

The Weitz complaint at paragraphs 10 and 23 reads as follows

10. A fence and fenceline were constructed no later than 1929 and
have existed in the same place since that time in the vicinity and
running easterly and westerly over the entire length of the quartersection line between the NE % and SE % of said Section 8 (the
"fence and fenceline"). R Vol. I, p. 19.
23. On information and belief, some Defendants or their agents, at
some time during the month of July, 2003, damaged a significant
portion of the fence and fenceline by cutting the fence wire

approximately every twenty feet of its length, by destroying some
fence posts, and by destroying rock piles that helped stabilize some
of the fence posts. R Vol. I, p. 22-23.
Taken together, these paragraphs assert that a fence really existed until defendants tore it
down. Of course at trial the court learned that this was false and that Weitz knew it all along.
Mrs. Weitz admitted that the original fence was not maintained after 1972 and had just fallen
into the ground from lack of maintenance. Tr p. 255, L. 7-1 1.
After Green bought the property, Mrs. Weitz hired Dana Townsend to build another
fence where the old one used to he. Tr p. 801, L. 23 - p. 802, L. 6. Mrs. Weitz knew that it was
this new fence that had been removed because she knew the original fence had already fallen into
the ground. Further, Mr. Townsend testified that it was he who created the rock gabions (piles).
Tr p. 822, L. 9 - p. 823, L. 17. The complaint falsely states that the original fence had rock piles
(gabions) and that these were destroyed by defendants or their agents.
After extensive parrying, Mrs. Weitz finally admitted that she was aware that the
condition of the "fence" mattered to her case. Tr p. 1345, L. 10 to p. 1347, L. 25. Knowing that
the "fence" was down and knowing that its condition mattered to her case, Consuelo Weitz hired
Dana Townsend to build a new one. Then Weitz filed a complaint, later verified by an affidavit,
that stated essentially that the original fence existed until July 2003 when defendants or their
agents tore it down. These were recklessly false statements designed to strengthen Weitz's
claim.

Adverse Possession

One might ask why in finding slander of title Judge Stegner chose the example of the
never completed eastern fence. One possibility is that the Judge had on his mind the fact that
shortly before trial he had denied Weitz's attempt to add a claim for adverse possession. He may
have chosen to make the finding that there had never been a complete enclosure because this
example also showed that Weitz's adverse possession claim could not have succeeded.
This thought might also explain why the trial judge gave two reasons for the failure of
Weitz's prescriptive easement claim. At page 6 (R Vol. VIII, p. 1641) of his final decision Judge
Stegner wrote:
An additional impediment to the Weitz family establishing a
prescriptive easement to the road is that they cannot establish
exclusive use of that road. In Simmons v. Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 118
P.2d 740 (1941), the Idaho Supreme Court held: "[a]n individual
using land as a road in common with the public cannot acquire a
prescriptive right of way against the owner." Id. at 144, 118 P.2d at
744. Numerous individuals, unconnected with the Weitz family,
used the trail during the time in question. Because it is necessary to
establish exclusive use in order to prove a prescriptive easement, this
is yet another reason why the Weitz family's claim of a prescriptive
easement must fail. R Vol. VIII, p. 1641-1642.
A showing of exclusive use is also required to prevail on an adverse possession claim. See Rice

v. Hill City Stock Yards, Co., 121 Idaho 576,826 P.2d 1288 (1992).
So the foregoing finding by Judge Stegner provides an additional reason why Weitz's
adverse possession claim could not succeed.

IV. APPLICABILITY OF I.C. 8 6-202. ACTIONS FOR TRESPASS
The section in Weitz's Reply Brief, at page 29, on this subject incorrectly claims that the
decision by Mr. and Mrs. Gerald Weitz to go upon the disputed property and completely change
the central piece of evidence in this dispute was made after the Rogers Trust and Green had
reached a settlement.
First the record shows conclusively that the settlement was reached weeks after the
decision to build a new fence was made. See Exhibit 10 - SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND
RELEASE OF CLAIMS dated August 1, 2003. See also the testimony of Dana Townsend
saying he was instructed to build the fence no later than July 16,2003. Tr p. 803, L. 7-9.
Second and more importantly, the record shows that it was during the preliminary
injunction hearing on April 15, 2005, about 20 months after the trespass by Weitz, that Weitz
and their attorney learned for the first time that a settlement between Green and Rogers Trust had
occurred. See the affidavit of attorney Landeck at paragraph 6. R Vol. 11, p. 299.
Why does Weitz try to create the false impression that they trespassed because Rogers
Trust and Green reached a settlement, when it is so easily refuted by the facts in the record?
The following facts surrounding the trespass are important. They reveal Mrs. Weitz's
true state of mind and the willful nature of her behavior.
The testimony of Mr. Townsend, who built the new fence, follows.

Q. [By Mr. Brown] What was that?
A. It was that Mr. Landeck had -- I guess there was probably some
discussion prior to that within that week that said we'd like you to
rebuild the fence up there and I need to check with my attorney on

that. And she contacted him and then later on, I don't know if it
was -- could have been that day or the following day she said well
I managed to get a hold of him and his word is go ahead, go up
there and rebuild the fence.

Q. Okay. Just to the best of your own ability could you just relate
to the Court the nature of the conversation that you had with Consi
Weitz concerning the type of direction she gave you in regards to
the fence building, just try to remember her words.
A. I think she just basically stated we would like you to rebuild
the fence and there was simply no -- there was no other discussion
is the best of memory serves me.. . Tr. P. 801 L. 14 to p. 802 L.6
Q. And then it's my understanding that the actual work that you did
on the property in regards to the fence was that -- well, you tell me
the dates, the July dates that you would have been there?

A. July 21st to the 25th probably. And what I stated before in the
deposition is that on the hours that are shown on the 17th of
Thursday was the -- probably very short order before that was
when I was instructed to build the fence. So I can even actually
further limit that down 14th, 15th or 16th was when I was
instructed to build the fence, the 17th is when I began cutting the
cedar fence posts for that actual project. And then on the 21st
through the 25th I started construction, reconstruction of the
fence up there on the ridge. (emphasis added) Tr p. 802, L. 24 to
p. 803, L. 13
At the end of his first answer set out above, Mr. Townsend testified that Mrs. Weitz said
"well I managed to get a hold of him and his word is go ahead, go up there and rebuild the
fence." (Emphasis added.)
Mr. Landeck did not give the go ahead to rebuild the fence. Mrs. Weitz was instructing
Mr. Townsend to build a whole new fence. What Mr. Landeck actually said is found in his
deposition placed in evidence at the trial.

Mr. Landeck's testimony on this point follows:

Q. [By Mr. Schwam] Okay. Did there come a time when you were
asked specifically about doing something to or with regard to the
disputed fence, and I mean by the Weitzes?
A. I believe the first specific discussion about anyone doing
anything to the fence occurred on July 16 of 2003.
Q. And would you tell me what transpired, who was present and
what were the discussions?

A. I'm refreshing my memory with reference to a billing statement.
I have no notes of this conversation, and I don't have a vivid
recollection of this conversation. So, I'm really relying on my the notes that I made for purposes - for billing purposes, which
indicate that I had an office conference with Consuelo which lasted
not more than fifteen minutes, in which we talked about the Green
dispute. We talked about fence repair, and we talked about the
logging plan. As to the fence repair, I recall being told that they
wanted to retain someone, hire someone to repair the fence. And,
my recollection is that I did not have any problem with them
repairing the fence and that I told her that. And, as to the logging
plan, she indicated that they had a desire to log in the area, and I
believe that I advised her to -that they ought not to log within the
disputed area, that that should be off limits for, while this - as this
- until this matter was resolved. (emphasis added) See deposition
of Ronald Landeck, considered by the court as testimony and
included in the record as an Exhibit, p. 27, L. 21 to p. 28, L. 24.
Q. Now, on the 16'~,did she ever tell you that they wanted to
employ a person to build a new fence?

A. No. See deposition of Ronald Landeck, p. 30, L. 2-5.
Mr. Landeck's July 24, 2003 billing is in evidence as Exhibit B to the Order Settling
Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript on Appeal: R Addendum Volume.
It reads in pertinent part (with emphasis added).

07/16/03
RJL Office conference with Consuelo Weitz
regarding Green dispute, fence repair and
logging plan.

0.25

45.00

Exhibit EE contains the photographs taken by Mr. Green after Mrs. Weitz told him that
she claimed there was a fence. Mr. Green testified that he photographed any and all signs of a
fence that he could find. EE shows that in late 2002 the fence was beyond repair and another
would have to be built before you could honestly describe what was there as a "fence".
As was just noted in the previous section of this brief, paragraphs 10 and 23 of the Weitz
Complaint, filed on February 4, 2004, falsely asserted that continuously up to February 2004 a
fence really existed. I am sure that in July 2003 Mr. Landeck actually believed that there was a
real fence upon which routine maintenance repairs could be done in order to preserve it in a
steady state condition. He must have still believed this in February, 2004 when he signed the
Complaint.
Thus, from Mr. Landeck's false perspective, which resulted from being lied to by his
client, it appeared that he was authorizing the maintenance of evidence in its current condition.
He could not have understood that his client was going to do something which would create new
and different evidence.
Weitz lied to their attorney regarding the condition of the "fence" until the preliminary
injunction hearing when Mrs. Weitz admitted that the fence had fallen into the ground. Given
that the half mile long fence had fallen into the ground and was only the "remains of a fence"

(See Judge Stegner's Decision, R Vol. VIII, p. 1640), it is natural that in instructing Mr.
Townsend. Mrs. Weitz used words like "rebuild" and "build". But Mrs. Weitz had to know that
no attorney would authorize the creation of new evidence; so with Mr. Landeck she used the
word "repair".
This sequence of events reveals why the court found that:
The facts establish that Mr. and Mrs. Weitz in pressing ahead were
unreasonable. (See Judge Stegner's Decision, R Vol. VIII, p.
1646).
These facts also reveal Judge Stegner's mistake in finding that being "unreasonable" constitutes
a defense to a finding of willfulness. (For a full discussion see Respondents' Brief pages 35 -

39.) What could be more "willful" than lying to your attorney and then further misleading your
attorney to get cover for evidence destruction or creation. The 240 trees were cut down as a
result of intentional and willful behavior by Weitz.

V. DAMAGES
On page 12 of Weitz's Reply Brief two separate arguments are made. One is made in the
second to last paragraph and one is made in the last paragraph.
Because the response to the argument in the last paragraph is shorter, it will be dealt with
first. Weitz wants to know why, if Green felt that 240 trees were lost, did Green not claim their
value from Rogers. At the time the trees were cut, land had already been sold to the Castles and
the Shooks, so it is assumed that "Green" is used collectively by Weitz. If any of the three
couples, including Todd and Tonia Green, had made claim for the lost trees against the Rogers
Trust, such a claim would have been frivolous.

The warranty deed (Exhibit D) given by the Trust to Todd and Tonia Green carries a
promise to defend title. It does not insure against a neighbor coming on the property and cutting
down trees.
It is doubtful that the Castles or Shooks have any rights against the Rogers Trust, but they
certainly have no rights beyond those of Greens.
The argument made in the second to last paragraph is that "there were not 240 trees cut".
Weitz's Reply Brief uses the word "shrubbery" to describe what was cut. But the
testimony of "the arborist who cut the shrubbery" (this quote is taken from page 12 of Weitz's
Reply Brief), Mr. Townsend, is set out below.
Q. Could you explain to the Court what you removed and why?

A. I removed small trees with the exception of one larger tree. The
small trees were removed because they were an obstruction to free
working in the vicinity. And some of the trees I simply thinned
them so that there would be a healthy mound of trees left. There
was even -- even too many in my opinion still left, but that wasn't
my orders to clear the land, my orders were to clear the fence. I
just simply did what was necessary to construct the fence. One
large tree that was, what I viewed a hazard to work under, a
widow maker, was located on the eastern partial there and that was
sawn down and cut and just distributed to the side. Tr p. 807, L. 17
to p. 808, L. 6.
Q. The Grand Fir -- were the majority of the trees or the saplings
that you removed, were they Fir?

A. I do believe so. I looked at the report, the Northwest
Management report and they had taken the tally on them and it
seemed like actually the species composition was pretty well
mixed between Grand Fir, Doug Fir and Ponderosa Pine. All
quite small and most of them under -- I mean, a couple with three

inch caliper size tree. (emphasis added) Tr p. 808, L. 18 to p. 809,
L. 1.

Portions of the Report from Northwest Management (Exhibit TT) appear below, and
provide the number and size of the trees removed from the Greens', Shooks', and Castles'
property by Weitz.
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During the trial, not a single witness disagreed with the foregoing tree count. Thus the
experts for Green and Weitz seem to agree that 240 trees were cut.
During the trial, Weitz's attorney used the word "saplings" and now uses the word
"shrubbery". It does not matter what word is used because the facts remain the same and the law
to be applied remains the same.
I.C. § 6-202 uses the phrase "any wood or underwood, tree or timber". The definition of
"underwood in the Wehster's Encyclopedia Unabridged Dictionary (1996 Edition) is "woody
shrubs or small trees growing among taller trees".
In our case trees were cut, but even if shrubs were cut I.C.

5 6-202 would still apply, and

the measure of damages for a temporary trespass would still be the cost of restoring the property
to its condition before the trespass.
VI. MARKET VALUE

At page 29 pf the Weitz's Reply Brief the testimony of Mr. Vahlkamp is mentioned. Mr.
Vahlkamp was a witness for Weitz who offered the opinion that cutting the trees did not impact
the market value of the property. Mr. Vahlkamp admitted that he came to this opinion without
the use of any comparahles.
The trial judge correctly determined that the effect, if any, on marketability was not the
measure of damages.

VII. MEASURE OF DAMAGES
The use of a hypothetical will clarify the measure of damages which should be applied to
our case.

Assume that a homeowner has a fruit tree in his backyard. The homeowner can not use
all of the fruit from the tree so he is not interested in maximizing output. The owner is interested
in having the small amount of h i t he uses be natural and chemical free. As a consequence much
h i t , some wormy, falls to the ground and lays there for awhile each season. Some of the fruit
falls into the homeowner's swimming pool along with leaves from the tree. The homeowner does
not mind this because he is retired and has time to clean out the pool each time he uses it.

An adjoining neighbor, however, has a second story sun deck upon which he sits. This
neighbor has come to hate the sight of spoiling fruit on the ground and in the pool. One day the
neighbor cuts down the tree.
The evidence at trial shows that the value of the tree for lumber was nothing and that the
market value of the property has either stayed the same or gone up because the market prefers
not to have to clean fruit and leaves from a swimming pool.
Does this mean that the homeowner has no redress and must pay out of his own pocket to
replace the fruit tree?
The measure of damages has to be the cost of restoring the property to the condition
before the trespass. If not, the trespasser's values, likes, and dislikes are imposed upon the
victim.
Returning to our case we find the victims of Weitz's trespass have a public record filed,
Exhibit DD in evidence, a Declaration of Protective Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions.
The last sentence in Section V of this document tells everyone that:

"Retention of the existing forest is of vital importance to maintain
the natural environment of the area and is viewed as a primary
objective of these Restrictive Covenants."
Section V also says that:
The harvesting of any timber solely for commercial gain is
prohibited.
Danial and Catherine Castle, Steven and Mary Shook, and Todd and Tonia Green, the
victims in our case, are entitled to have their trees replaced.
Harold Osbome, a witness for Weitz, testified as follows:

Q. [BY MR. BROWN] Okay. And then when were you contacted
in regards to helping the Weitzes in regards to their timber
management?
A. They formally contacted me in the spring of 2003.

Q. Do you know what month?

A. My notes, records indicate we sat down at the table in April,
specifically April 26 when we were talking in somewhat detail
about what I might provide for them as a forestry service.
Q. And then was it after -- at that time did that initiate your
involvement in helping them do some, I'll say, logging up on their
property?
A. Yes. Tr p. 1367, L. 17 top. 1368, L. 4

At almost exactly the time of the trespass, Weitz, with the help of Mr. Osbome, was
engaged in the commercial logging of the Weitz property.
If the damages are not based on the cost of replacing the trees, but instead upon some
wood value method, then the victims, Greens, Shooks, and Castles will have the values of Weitz,

the trespasser, imposed upon them.
Aside from the obvious unfairness of this result, it would be contrary to the law, as was
fully discussed in Respondents' first brief at pages 39-44.

VIII. AD HOMZNEM ATTACKS
In the trial and the briefing, Weitz through their attorney have made repeated ad hominem
attacks upon Todd Green. He has been accused of being greedy, of wearing blinders, and of
having an agenda, presumably sinister.
Todd Green, in purchasing this property upon which he built his family home, expected it
to bring some joy into his family's lives, but instead his new neighbor slandered his title and
trespassed upon his property. Todd went to his seller who had by warranty deed promised to
defend Green's title. As it happens, the seller preferred to make a one time payment and be
released from all liability and the duty to defend the title. An agreement to do this was made and
the Greens have fulfilled their duty, and their promises to Shooks and Castles, by successfully
defending everyone's title.
The post trial filings regarding attorney fees and costs show that Todd and Tonia Green
have had to spend in excess of $160,000.00.
The judgment against Weitz reveals that Todd and Tonia Green have been awarded
$52,738.12 in attorney fees, damages and costs.
The trial record reflects that the Greens received $46,247.16 to release the Rogers Trust
and to take on its duty to defend.

As things stand now, without adding in the attorney fees relating to the appeal, the
Greens have lost in excess of $60,000.00.
Thus, if the appeal does not change anything, Todd and Tonia Green, who did nothing
but be the victims of slander of title and trespass, will suffer a loss of more than $60,000.00 plus
their substantial attorney fees on appeal.
There is nothing in this case that justifies the ad hominem attacks on Todd Green, but
there is a great deal about this case that cries out for a decision that would fully compensate the
Greens.

CONCLUSION
The trial court should be affirmed with regard to all of Weitz's claims and the Green,
Shook, and Castle slander of title claim. The trial court's finding of trespass by Weitz should be
amplified to include a violation of I.C. § 6-202 and remanded to the trial court to make an award
of attorney fees under I.C. § 6-202. There should also be a remand to assess damages based on
the cost of replacing the trees. Attorney fees and costs should be awarded to Greens on appeal.
zh
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